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Abstract — Hiding information in network traffic may lead to 
leakage of confidential information. In this paper we introduce 
a new steganographic system: the PadSteg (Padding 
Steganography). To authors’ best knowledge it is the first 
information hiding solution which represents interprotocol 
steganography i.e. usage of relation between two or more 
protocols from the TCP/IP stack to enable secret 
communication. PadSteg utilizes ARP and TCP protocols 
together with an Etherleak vulnerability (improper Ethernet 
frame padding) to facilitate secret communication for hidden 
groups in LANs (Local Area Networks). Basing on real 
network traces we confirm that PadSteg is feasible in today’s 
networks and we estimate what steganographic bandwidth is 
achievable while limiting the chance of disclosure. We also 
point at possible countermeasures against PadSteg.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Network steganography is currently seen as a rising 
threat to network security. Contrary to typical steganographic 
methods which utilize digital media (pictures, audio and 
video files) as a cover for hidden data (steganogram), 
network steganography utilizes communication protocols’ 
control elements and their basic intrinsic functionality. As a 
result, such methods may be harder to detect and eliminate. 
In order to minimize the potential threat to public 
security, identification of such methods is important as is the 
development of effective detection (steganalysis) methods. 
This requires both an in-depth understanding of the 
functionality of network protocols and the ways in which it 
can be used for steganography. Many methods had been 
proposed and analyzed so far – for the detailed review see 
Zander et al. [2] or Petitcolas et al. [3]. 
Typical network steganography method uses 
modification of a single network protocol. The protocol 
modification may be applied to the PDU (Protocol Data 
Unit) [1], [4], [5], time relations between exchanged PDUs 
[6], or both [14] (hybrid methods). As far as the authors are 
aware, PadSteg (Padding Steganography), presented in this 
paper, is the first steganographic system that utilizes what we 
have defined as interprotocol steganography i.e. usage of 
relation between two or more different network protocols to 
enable secret communication – PadSteg utilizes Ethernet 
(IEEE 802.3), ARP and TCP protocols. 
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ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) [10] is a simple 
protocol which operates between the data link and network 
layers of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model. In 
IP networks it is used mainly to determine the hardware 
MAC (Media Access Control) address when only a network 
protocol address (IP address) is known. ARP is vital for 
proper functioning of any switched LAN (Local Area 
Network) although it can raise security concerns e.g. it may 
be used to launch an ARP Poisoning attack. 
In Ethernet, frame length is limited to a minimum of 64 
octets, due to the CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/ 
Collision Detection) mechanism, and a maximum of 1500 
octets. Therefore, any frames whose length is less than 64 
octets have to be padded with additional data. The minimal 
size of an Ethernet data field is 46 octets and can be filled 
with data originating from any upper layer protocol, without 
encapsulation via the LLC (Link Layer Control), because 
LLC (with its 8 octets header) is very rarely utilized in 802.3 
networks.  
However, due to ambiguous standardization (RFC 894 
and RFC 1042), implementations of padding mechanism in 
current NICs (Network Interface Cards) drivers vary. 
Moreover, some drivers handle frame padding incorrectly 
and fail to fill it with zeros. As a result of memory leakage, 
an Ethernet frame padding may contain portions of kernel 
memory. This vulnerability is discussed in Atstake report and 
is called Etherleak [9]. Data inserted in padding by Etherleak 
is considered unlikely to contain any valuable information; 
therefore it does not pose serious threat to network security 
as such. However, it creates a perfect candidate for a carrier 
of the steganograms, thus it may be used to compromise 
network defenses. Utilization of padding in Ethernet frames 
for steganographic purposes was originally proposed by 
Wolf [13]. If every frame has padding set to zeros (as stated 
in standard), its usage will be easy to detect. With the aid of 
Etherleak, this information hiding scheme may become 
feasible as it will be hard to distinguish frames affected by 
Etherleak from those with steganogram. 
In this paper we propose a new steganographic system 
PadSteg, which can be used in LANs and utilizes ARP and 
TCP protocols together with an Etherleak vulnerability. We 
conduct a feasibility study for this information hiding 
system, taking into account the nature of todays’ networks. 
We also suggest possible countermeasures against PadSteg. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the Etherleak vulnerability and related work with 
regard to the application of padding for steganographic 
purposes. Section 3 includes a description of PadSteg 
components. Section 4 presents experimental results for real-
life LAN traffic which permit for an evaluation of feasibility 
of the proposed solution. Section 5 discusses possible 
methods of detection and/or elimination of the proposed 
information hiding system. Finally, Section 6 concludes our 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. The Etherleak vulnerability 
The aforementioned ambiguities within the 
standardization cause differences in implementation of the 
padding in Ethernet frames. Some systems have an 
implemented padding operation inside the NIC hardware (so 
called auto padding), others have it in the software device 
drivers or even in a separate layer 2 stack.  
In the Etherleak report Arkin and Anderson [9] 
presented in details an Ethernet frame padding information 
leakage problem. They also listed almost 50 device drivers 
from Linux 2.4.18 kernel that are vulnerable. 
Due to the inconsistency of padding content of short 
Ethernet frames (its bits should be set to zero but in many 
cases they are not), information hiding possibilities arise. 
That is why it is possible to use the padding bits as a carrier 
of steganograms. 
Since Arkin and Anderson’s report dates back to 2003, 
we performed an experiment in order to verify whether 
Etherleak is an issue in today’s networks. The achieved 
results confirmed that many NICs are still vulnerable (see 
experimental results in Section 4).  
 
B. Data hiding using padding 
Padding can be found at any layer of the OSI RM, but 
typically it is exploited for covert communications only in 
the data link, network and transport layers. 
Wolf in [13], proposed a steganographic method which 
utilizes padding of 802.3 frames. Its achievable 
steganographic bandwidth is up to 45 bytes/frame.  
Fisk et al. [7] presented padding of the IP and TCP 
headers in the context of active wardens. Each of these fields 
offers up to 31 bits/packet for steganographic 
communication. 
Padding of IPv6 packets for information hiding was 
described by Lucena et al. in [8] and offers a couple of 
channels with a steganographic bandwidth up to 256 
bytes/packet. 
 
III. COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED STEGANOGRAPHIC 
SYSTEM 
 
PadSteg enables secret communication in a hidden group 
in a LAN environment. In such group, each host willing to 
exchange steganograms should be able to locate and identify 
other hidden hosts. To provide this functionality certain 
mechanisms must be specified. In our proposal, ARP 
protocol, together with improper Ethernet frame padding are 
used to provide localization and identification of the 
members of a hidden group. To exchange steganograms 
improper Ethernet frame padding is utilized in frames that in 
upper layer use TCP protocol. That is why, in this section we 
first describe ARP protocol, and then we focus on proposed 
steganographic system operations. 
 
A. Overview of ARP Protocol 
ARP returns the layer 2 (data link) address for a given 
layer 3 address (network layer). This functionality is realized 
with two ARP messages: Request and Reply. The ARP 
header is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. ARP header format  
 
ARP header fields have the following functions: 
• HTYPE (Hardware Type) – type of data link protocol 
used by sender (1 is inserted if it is Ethernet).  
• PTYPE (Protocol Type) – type of network protocol in 
network layer (0800h is inserted if IP is used).  
• HLEN (Hardware Length) – length of hardware 
address fields: SHA, THA (in bytes).  
• PLEN (Protocol Length) – length of protocol address 
fields: SPA, THA (in bytes).  
• OPER (Operation) – defines, whether the frame is an 
ARP REQUEST (1) or REPLY (2) message.  
• SHA (Sender Hardware Address) – sender data link 
layer address (MAC address for Ethernet). 
• SPA (Sender Protocol Address) – sender network 
layer address. 
• THA (Target Hardware Address) – data link layer 
address of the target. This field contains zeros 
whenever a REQUEST ARP message is sent. 
• TPA (Target Protocol Address) – network layer 
address of the target. This field contains zeros if 
REQUEST ARP message is sent. 
 
An example of ARP communication with Request/Reply 
exchange, captured with the Wireshark sniffer 
(www.wireshark.org), is presented in Fig. 2. First, ARP 
Request is issued (1), which is used by the host with IP 
address 10.7.6.29 to ask other stations (by means of 
broadcast): ‘Who has IP 10.7.56.47?’. In order to send a 
frame intended for everyone in a broadcast domain, Ethernet 
header destination address must be set to 
FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF (2). Next, host with IP address 
10.7.56.47 replies directly to 10.7.6.29 using unicast ARP 
Reply (3) with its MAC address.  
 
 
Figure 1. ARP exchange captured with Wireshark  
 
Basing on the proposed description of ARP protocol, it 
can be concluded that ARP header is rather of fixed content 
and presents little possibilities for information hiding. One 
opportunity is to modulate address fields like it was proposed 
in [11] or [8]. However, this solution provides limited 
steganographic bandwidth if certain level of undetectability 
is to be achieved. Moreover, it may result in improper IP and 
MAC address advertisements which may make this method 
more prone to detection. 
Thus, in the proposed steganographic system PadSteg, 
we utilize ARP Request messages, broadcasted throughout 
LAN, to make other members of the hidden group become 
aware of the presence of a new member. 
 
B. Steganographic system operation 
PadSteg is designed for LANs only because it utilizes 
improper Ethernet frame padding in Ethernet. It also uses 
ARP and TCP protocols to control hidden groups and 
steganograms exchange. PadSteg operation can be split into 
two phases: 
• Phase I: Advertisement of the hidden nodes.  
• Phase II: Hidden data exchange.  
 
Phase I 
This phase is based on the exchange of ARP Request 
messages with improper Ethernet frame padding (Fig. 3).  
Hidden node that wants to advertise itself to others in the 
group, broadcasts an ARP Request message (1) and inserts 
advertising sequence into the padding bits. It consists of: a 
random number (different from 0) and hash which is 
calculated based on this random number and source MAC 
address. An example of the padding bits format (which for 
ARP is 144 bits long), for the MD5 hash function, is 
presented in Fig. 4.  
All the hidden nodes are obligated to analyze the padding 
of all received ARP Requests. If an ARP Request is received 
with padding that is not all zeros, it is analyzed by extracting 
the random number and the corresponding hash is calculated 
(2). If the received and calculated hashes are the same then it 
means that a new hidden node is available for steganographic 
exchange. Each hidden node stores a list of nodes from 
which it has received advertisements. Every node should also 
reissue ARP Request at certain time intervals to inform other 
hidden nodes about its existence. To limit the chance of 
detection, sending of ARP Requests may not happen too 
often (3, 4). In ARP, if an entry in host ARP cache is not 
refreshed within 1 to 20 minutes (implementation dependent) 
it expires and is removed. Thus, hidden nodes should mimic 
such behavior to imitate the sending of ARP Requests caused 
by ARP cache expiration. 
 
 
Figure 3. Hidden group activation phase 
 
Adoption of ARP messages for identification of new 
hidden nodes has two advantages: 
• The broadcast messages will be received by all hosts 
in LAN. 
• The ARP traffic totals to about 0.1% of all traffic (see 
next Section for details), so this choice is also 
beneficial from the performance perspective. Each 
hidden node does not have to analyze all of the 
received traffic but only ARP Requests. 
 
 
Figure 4. Padding format of ARP Request messages for the 
activation phase 
 
 
Phase II 
After the identification of a new hidden node other 
hidden nodes analyze Ethernet frame padding in every TCP 
segment sent from that MAC address. The received TCP 
segments’ padding contains steganogram bits.  
The bidirectional transmission is realized as presented in 
Fig. 5. Two hidden nodes make a overt TCP connection e.g. 
they transfer a file (1). During the connection TCP ACK 
segments are issued with improper Ethernet frame padding 
(2 and 4). Received TCP segments are analyzed for improper 
Ethernet padding presence and secret data is extracted (3 and 
1 
3 
2 
5). For third party observer such communication looks like 
usual data transfer. 
 
 
Figure 5. Hidden group steganograms exchange phase 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND STEGANOGRAPHIC 
BANDWIDTH ESTIMATION 
A. ARP and improper Ethernet frame padding in real-life 
networks 
To evaluate the proposed steganographic system: its 
steganographic bandwidth and undetectability, real network 
traffic from LAN was captured.  
The experiment was conducted at the Institute of 
Telecommunications at Warsaw University of Technology 
between 15 and 19 of March 2010 (from Monday to Friday). 
It resulted in about 37 million packets captured, which 
corresponds, daily, to 7.43 million frames on average (with 
a standard deviation 1.2 million frames) – for details see 
Table 1. The traffic was captured with the aid of Dumpcap 
which is part of the Wireshark sniffer ver. 1.3.3 
(www.wireshark.org). The sources of traffic were ordinary 
computer devices placed in several university laboratories 
and employees’ ones but also peripherals, servers and 
network equipment. To analyze the captured traffic and 
calculate statistics TShark (which is also part of Wireshark) 
was utilized. Statistics were calculated per day, and average 
results are presented.  
TABLE I.  THE NUMBER OF CAPTURED FRAMES PER DAY 
 
The captured traffic classification by upper layer protocol 
is presented in Fig. 6. Three quarters of the traffic was 
HTTP. Together with SSH, UDP and SSL protocols it sums 
up to about 93% of the traffic. 
Almost 22% (with a standard deviation of 7.7%) of all 
daily traffic had padding bits added (~8 million frames). It is 
obvious that not all of the frames were affected since 
padding is added only to small-sized packets.  
The upper layer protocols that most frequently led to 
generation of padded frames are presented in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Figure 6. Captured traffic characteristics 
 
 
Figure 7. Upper layer protocols that result in padded Ethernet 
frames  
 
However, it is important to note, that almost 22% of the 
padded frames experienced improper padding (~1.8 million 
frames). These frames were generated by about 15% of 
hosts in the inspected network (their NICs were produced 
among others by some US leading vendors). We considered 
Ethernet frame padding improper if the padding bits were 
not set to zeros. Table 2 shows for which network protocols 
frames were mostly improperly padded. 
 
TABLE II.  UPPER LAYER PROTCOLS AFFECTED WITH ETHERNET 
FRAME IMPROPER PADDING IN EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
No. of 
frames 7,205,904 7,027,170 5,761,723 8,241,832 8,945,403 
Affected 
protocol TCP ARP ICMP Others 
[%] 93.19 4.17 2.31 0.32 
TCP segments with an ACK flag set (which have no 
payload) result in frames that have to be padded, thus, it is 
no surprise that ~93% of improperly padded traffic is TCP. 
Nearly all of this traffic consists of ACK segments. Other 
frames that had improper padding were caused by ARP and 
ICMP messages (~6.5%). 
PadSteg is based on the ARP protocol, thus our aim was 
also to find out ARP statistics i.e. what are the most 
frequently used ARP messages, what is their distribution 
and how many of them have improper padding. The results 
are presented in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Captured ARP characteristics  
 
Not surprisingly, the most frequently sent ARP messages 
were ARP Request (~56.3%) and Reply (~43.4%), while 
Gratuitous ARP messages are in minority (~0.2%). Out of 
all ARP messages almost 20% had improper padding. 
 
B. Steganographic bandwidth estimation 
Let us try to estimate PadSteg steganographic bandwidth 
for a single hidden node transmitting in a hidden group.  
Because, currently, there are no tools for steganography 
detection, in real-life networks, every member of a hidden 
group can exchange almost unlimited number of 
steganograms and remain undiscovered. However, if the 
network traffic is consequently monitored, a naive use of 
PadSteg – that is: excessive generation of Ethernet frames 
with improper padding may be easily detected. 
This leads to conclusion that it is important to evaluate 
what is the realistic steganographic bandwidth under the 
assumption that the secret data exchange will not differ from 
other hosts’ traffic burdened with the Etherleak 
vulnerability. To achieve this goal steganographic user’s 
network activity must mimic behavior of other users in 
terms of sending Ethernet frames with improper padding. 
We calculated the steganographic bandwidth of the 
proposed system based on the average, daily number of TCP 
segments with improper Ethernet padding per susceptible 
host (see Table 3). 
Because each TCP segment’s padding is 6 bytes long, the 
average steganographic bandwidth is about 27 bit/s (with a 
standard deviation of about 12 bit/s). Therefore, if the 
hidden node generates Ethernet frames with improper 
padding that fall within the average range, for the inspected 
LAN network, steganographic communication may remain 
undetected. 
TABLE III.   THE NUMBER OF FRAMES WITH IMPROPER PADDING PER 
HOST (FOR TCP PROTOCOL) 
 
V. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES 
Our proposal of the new steganographic system, PadSteg, 
proves that such phenomenon like interprotocol 
steganography is possible and may pose a threat to network 
security.  
In today’s LANs, with security measures they provide, 
PadSteg will be hard to detect. The main reason for this is 
that current IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection/Prevention 
System) systems are rarely used to analyze all traffic 
generated in a LAN as this would be hard to achieve from 
the performance point of view. Moreover, usually 
IDSs/IPSs operate on signatures, therefore they require 
continuous signatures updates of the previously unknown 
steganographic methods, especially, if the information 
hiding process is distributed over more than one network 
protocol (as it is in PadSteg).  
Thus, the best steps we can take to alleviate PadSteg in 
LANs are to: 
• Ensure that there are no NICs with Etherleak 
vulnerability in the LAN. 
• Enhance IDS/IPS rules to include PadSteg and deploy 
them in LANs. 
• Improve access devices (e.g. switches) by adding 
active warden functionality [7] i.e. ability to modify 
(set to zeros) Ethernet frame padding if an improper 
one is encountered. 
 
Implementation of the specified countermeasures greatly 
minimizes the risk of successful PadSteg utilization. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented new steganographic system - 
PadSteg – which is the first information hiding solution 
based on interprotocol steganography.  
It may be deployed in LANs and it utilizes two protocols 
to enable secret data exchange: Ethernet and ARP/TCP. A 
steganogram is inserted into Ethernet frame padding but one 
must always "look" at the other layer protocol (ARP or 
TCP) to determine whether it contains secret data or not. 
Based on the results of conducted experiment the average 
steganographic bandwidth of PadSteg was roughly 
estimated to be 27 bit/s. It is a quite significant number 
considering other known steganographic methods. 
Date Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
No. of 
frames 177,653 374,285 217,099 559,866 370,579 
In order to minimize the potential threat of interprotocol 
steganography to public security identification of such 
methods is important. Equally crucial is the development of 
effective countermeasures. This requires an in-depth 
understanding of the functionality of network protocols and 
the ways in which they can be used for steganography. 
However, considering the complexity of network 
protocols being currently used, there is not much hope that a 
universal and effective steganalysis method can be 
developed. Thus, after each new steganographic method is 
identified, security systems must be adapted to the new, 
potential threat.  
As a future work larger volumes of traffic from different 
LANs should be analyzed in order to pinpoint more 
accurately PadSteg feasibility and calculate its 
steganographic bandwidth. 
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